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Abstract-Computer processing of large non-preedited natural language texts has often been limited either 
to managing and editing or to analysing basic level\ of content (indexes, concordances, clusters, etc.). Few 
systems approach syntactic information, even less semantic information. Because of the complexity and the 
originality of the underlying semantic information of any text it is not possible to import directly the 
A.I. and computational semantic concepts. It is necessary to explore news paths. The research presented 
here is oriented toward the understanding of certain semantic aspects in computer text processing (words and 
meaning representation and inference patterns). This is done through a model theoretic approach embedded in 
an algebraic language. The hypothesis which governs the concepts and the distinctions is the following: 
discourse in a text constitutes a semantic space built of an ordered set of sentences which areof different logical 
types and which present a specific pattern of coherence expressible in a syntactic manner. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From 1960 to the seventies many of the advanced uses of the computer in the field of 
humanities and social sciences, except for the statistical packages, were concentrated on 
building more and more sophisticated systems capable of storing, parsing and analysing natural 
language texts. These systems produced indexes, concordances, content analysis etc. (EYE- 
BALL, GENERAL INQUIRER, COCOA, SATO, JEUDEMO, CONCORD, SYNTOL). 
Many of these systems shared the common paradigm of working on a large, minimally 
pre-edited text. The challenge met by these systems was in copying, editing, classifying, 
managing and analysing a large amount of natural anguage information. They were, in a sense, 
text information retrievers. But most of them were limited to processing the basic level of 
information, i.e. the word. They were seldom sensitive to the syntactic level, even less to the 
semantic one. Compared with the artificial intelligence understanding systems of the seventies, 
they were quite simple. However, in their simplicity they were useful for scholarly research and 
simple editorial tasks, as the market shows by the success of word processing packages, packages 
that are but a pale shadow of the original text processors. Limited to tasks of editing, these 
latter systems never attain the content except for indexes. Scholarly research, as well as text 
database documentary systems, now demand more and more sophisticated retrieval and 
analysis techniques. 
In the seventies, and in the wake of A.1 success, some systems attempted to integrate more 
complex levels of analysis. Always working in the paradigm of large, non p-e-edited natural 
language texfs (hereafter NPNL texts), these later systems explored mainly the syntactic level 
(description and analysis); some attained a high level of success in parsing sentences of a 
specific natural language (EYEBALL, DEREDEC, PHLIQAI). But to our knowledge, no 
significant attempt has been made to build NPNL text processors sensitive to the semantic 
aspects, except through basic lexical categories (as in classical content analysis) or through 
general classification schemes of lexical or discourse content (summaries, resumes, database, 
representations. etc.). 
Now, it is true that many AI projects have worked on NPNL texts (e.g. Wilks, Schank, 
Charniak); however, these texts were quite limited in size (5 pages at the most). In addition, 
their focus of research was to define the structure of information (lexical meaning, world 
representation, etc.) necessary for the presumed “understanding” (or paraphrasing) of certain 
sentences of the texts. Nowhere but in some translating projects have large NPNL texts been 
accepted. Still. these projects were not oriented for content analysis of for information retrieval 
and mainly were limited to a specific domain. These AI. systems aimed at exploring a NPNL 
text in such a way as to extract complex structured information; this task does not necessarily 
demand a full understanding of the text. We should stress that many users in the field of the 
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humanities and social research prefer the computer not to “understand” the text. What they 
are looking for is much more an intermediary structured information that would permit more 
exhaustive or complex analysis, such as thematic, lexical, textual structure, etc. Something 
similar could be said for the user of NPNL data based documentary systems. Often, they only 
have a vague idea of the content, (e.g. journals, legal or medical texts, library reports, office 
documents). The request here is much more related to an exploration of these documents than 
to a translation, paraphrase, deduction, etc. 
Some systems have attempted to explore such higher levels of structured information 
through the paradigms ofartificial intelligence. But often they failed, because the paradigm was not 
applicable on such large texts. In effect, how could a system ever store all the information 
necessary for understanding “the complete works of Shakespeare”? More even, how could we 
provide information about exts for which we have but a small idea of their content (e.g. parsing the 
criminal code, the daily journal, etc.). 
Thus, a clear theoretical definition of what tasks are involved in text information retrieving 
is essential. Too often the categories of understanding systems are used directly to model text 
processing system. This inevitably leads to their failure because text information processors 
cannot be text understanders! 
The research we report on in this paper is oriented towards the understanding, through 
model theoretic concepts, of some aspects of the semantics involved in the processing of a 
non-preedited natural anguage text. For instance: “What is the logical status of the meaning 
representation, the compositional processes and the inference rules underlying the questions 
and answers on and from a NPNL texts? For example, given a natural anguage text of a few 
hundred pages, how can we interrogate it in such a manner as to find in it the pertinent sentence as 
answer to a specific question? (E.g. if a text has a sentence “John murdered Mary” can it be found 
as an answer to the question: Is Mary dead?) 
These theoretical considerations are related to a concrete conversational text processor we 
are building. This system, called ACT0 (Analyse conversationnelle de textes par ordinateur), 
through a complex managing and parsing system called DEREDEC, can economically store a 
large text (a few hundred pages), do the basic editing and managing, and parse each sentence as 
well as deliver a syntactic surface structure with indications of its basic grammatical depen- 
dencies, (subject-predicate d termination, etc.). Finally, it can, in a recursive manner, reparse 
the syntactically structured text for either complex content analysis of question answering 
experiments(l]. If this system is to be sensitive to certain semantic information (synonyms, 
paraphases, inferences) it must develop a semantic grammar. 
2. TEXT AND DISCOURSE 
As the literature on text processing and understanding has shown, one should distinguish 
between a text and a discourse. What is printed is a text, what is understood is a discourse. A 
text expresses a discourse. Texts can be printed, not discourses. The same discourse can be 
present in different texts. A discourse is to a text, what a proposition is to a sentence. Texts and 
discourses do not have the same identity criteria. 
When transferred to the field of computer text processors, this distinction becomes lightly 
more complicated. As any human must do in reading a text, a text processing system (hereafter 
called P-system) must have access to the discourse. It is there that it finds the syntactic, 
semantic and pragmatic information ecessary for more sophisticated text parsing. But what is 
a discourse in a computer? 
To be clear about what we are referring to we shall define some basic concepts: We shall 
call the original text, i.e. the one that is printed, typed or the manuscript of the original text, the 
o-text, and the discourse related to it, the o-discourse. 
In the computer, the o-text and o-discourse will be transcribed into what we shall call an 
electronic script, or e-script (as opposed to manuscript). In this e-script we shall find the 
t-script (or computer transcripts) for all the t-sentences of the original text. We shall also find a 
d-script containing the computer transcripts of any information pertaining to the o-discourse or 
the o-text. This d-script may be about the underlying syntactic structures of each t-sentence 
(deep, shallow or surface). It also could be about their propositional content ogether with their 
lexical composition, their inclusion in conceptual schemata, etc. Others could be about some 
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possible state of affairs in the world, and even meaning postulates for 
d-script and t-script hence form an ordered set of sentences of some 
Let us then represent hese simple distinctions in Fig. 1. 
a specific language. This 
sort, that is the e-script. 
In the world In the computer 
o-discourse 
o-text 
e-script 
d-script 
f-script 
Fig. I 
Having reduced a text and a discourse to an e-script, let us now reflect more deeply on its 
composition. As an e-script is but a list of sentences, two basic questions arise, (a) where do 
they come from? and (b) what is their logical status? 
(a) The origin of the e-script and e-sentences 
For the t-script, the problem of its origin is simple. All t-sentences are but the tran- 
scriptions of the original text. The transcription function that takes an o-sentence and produces 
a computer version of it is theoretically simple, but it is often materially a complex one, i.e. a 
copying and storing program. 
The question of the origin of d-sentences i  more complex, and it is often at this point that 
the difference between these text processing systems and A.I. text understanding systems 
(U-systems) appears. If these latter systems are to parse specific sentences for some underlying 
information (propositional content, logical structure, possible inferences) they should have 
access to higher order information (semantic nets, schemata, hierarchies, frames, etc.). And it is 
from this higher order information that they will compositionally infer the “semantic” structure 
of a particular sentence. 
But how are these U-systems informed of this higher-order information? The answer is 
quite obvious. In most systems this is done by stipulation. This information is never learned. In 
fact, these higher types of information are part of the essence of the understanding program 
and are defined in a stipulative manner long before any processing has actually started. 
In a P-system this information must also exist in order for a sentence token to receive a 
semantic representation. But why should it be given way before any processing has started, and 
why should it be given by one source? There are many conceivable ways by which a particular 
f-sentence can receive or infer d-sentences expressing their various semantic omponents and 
structures. 
In our system, ACTO, we define both the content and the inferential pattern in a con- 
versational manner, from which ACT0 can afterwards generalize and hence “learn”from the text 
itself. 
The preceding remarks are important for defining the task involved in P-systems. They 
distinguish clearly the generic problem from the logical one. By “generic problem” we mean the 
origin of the higher-order information from which can be compositionally infered specific 
semantic information for each token sentence. By “logical problem” we mean the role and 
function of this higher order information, in the overall discourse explicitation. What we here 
maintain is that as with any A.I. -system, a P-system must have some semantic information 
having the same logical function or status but it may acquire it in a quite different manner. 
(b) The logical status 
Independently, then. of how a P-system can acquire this higher order information one must 
be clear about its logical role and function. Be it the A.I. or the computational pproach to 
semantics. it’s that a P-system can parse a sentence, choose the pertinent interpretation, if not 
informed of this higher order information. But this does not give us the logical type of the 
information. What is the role of a world representation? Of a lexical meaning representation? 
Are they identical? What is their logical status? 
In these areas, the literature does not offer the clearest heories. One encounters here more 
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operational definitions than really logical ones. If a lexical decomposition or a world represen- 
tation manages to output the right inferences, it will then often be said to be adequate for that 
purpose. This leaves us in the dark as to the logical status of then semantic informations as to 
their real logical status. 
So in order to clarify this status as others have done[2-51, we shall try here to translate 
some of the A.I. concepts of world representation and frames or the computational-inter- 
pretative semantics in model-theoretic terms. 
In this line of thought, a world representation can be understood as a model for a set of 
sentences; that is, it is a description (predicative or procedural) of an actual or possible state of 
affairs in which a particular sentence can be said to be true of false. Often, though, a concrete 
world representation is not only a model. It contains something else, as well. In fact, one will 
often find not only information about the word but also the “meaning” of the word, meaning 
that will be expressed either in the Katzian manner or the Quillian way. 
But whatever the semantic representation advanced, be it the interpretative, (a la Katz- 
Fodor, Weinreich, Miller John-Laird, Jackendoff, etc.), or the computational one (a la Wilks. 
Schank, Winograd, Rumelhart, Charniak, Schubert) independently of their formalization and 
notational variants, either can be seen as trying to express the truth conditions of an NL 
language disambiguated sentence. In one sense, as maintained Kempson[6] and Hayes [2], these 
are semantic representations of the Tarskian T-convention. They could even be understood as the 
meaning postulates for a set of d-script sentences. Hence from a logical point of view, the status of 
a set of d-sentences that express the underlying discourse information may be of two different sort: 
i.e. first, these sentences can express the truth conditions of T-sentences, while secondly, at the 
same time they can refer to models retained in the f-script. 
For example, the t-sentence “John kills Mary” can be said to have its truth conditions 
expressed in this possible d-sentence “(John CAUSES Mary Be Dead)” which in turn, because 
it originates in an o-text, is said to be asserted in a possible world. 
These remarks bring us to the related problem of the formalization of semantic information. 
Considerable debate in A.I. semantic theories has taken place on the subject of the logical and 
the procedural representation of semantic information, and the various interpretations of these 
concepts have not always been of the clearest kind. We are of the opinion that this debate 
stems from a confusion between logical status and logical formalization. Having a logical status 
does not necessarily mean logical formalization; that is, the main quality semantic information 
must have is characterizable by a specific role and function in a system (i.e. it must present 
definite criteria of identity). 
Compared with logical status, formalization is secondary. It is true that for some systems 
the representation of semantic and inferential information should be the least ambiguous ort 
possible and the most rule-governed. But for others, it may be just the opposite. But even if one 
chooses between a strict predicate language, a relational net language (e.g. a semantic and 
hierarchical net) or a fuzzy set one, these particular meta-languages and their notational variants 
do not define the logical status of the semantic information. They help only to describe, in a 
controllable fashion, their logical or semi-logical structure. They embody differently the 
semantic information, and some render processing more easily than others[7]. Some have a 
higher degree of expressive adequacy than others. 
As Woods[8] and Katz[9] have shown, the literature on this subject has often confused the 
logical status with the formalization, notational and computational problem. Whatever the 
semantic representation chosen, it must have a logical status, and this status must not be 
confused with its expression in a formal language which, in turn, can have notational variants 
(e.g. Polish vs Russellian otation, set theoretical or algebraic). 
So, in building a P-system for processing NPNL texts one should be clear about the logical 
status and structure of the semantic information involved. This may seem quite obvious, yet in 
the practice of text processing as compared with AI. understanding systems, the various levels 
and types of semantic information involved are not clearly understood, as has been shown in 
the large literature on text linguistics[lO, 11, 51. As an illustration, if one simulates in a 
Gedanken experiment some of the possible d-sentences to be related to a t-sentence. one would 
easily see the complexity of the logical status and structure of these d-sentences. They would 
immediately show their various differences in identity. Some d-sentences are a representation 
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of the syntactic structure, others of the lexical information, of the logical structure 
(quantifiation, modalisation, etc.), of inference patterns, of the pragmatic-performative dimen- 
sion, etc. As an example, for the t-sentence “John killed Mary” a P-system could be given by a 
function (stipulative or computational), a transcription or a d-sentence in the form of its 
categorical syntactic structure S(N(John) S/NN (kill) N(Mary)) a predicative categorical 
semantic representation of some sort such as: ((John DO X) CAUSE (Mary Be Dead)) or in any 
Schubert [ 121, Miller and Johnson-Laird [131 or Dowty [ 141 manner. 
As can be seen, these two sentences or d-transcripts are expressions of some aspects of the 
discourse content. They are in one sense related to the truth conditions of the t-sentence. They 
were both generated in some way (by stipulation). They do not have the same logical level and 
are not even in the same formal language. Hence it follows that our d-script is composed of 
many d-sentences or d-transcripts, all having a specific logical status and having some mutual 
relations. 
The question we shall now address is how to understand and formalize some aspects of the 
structure of these d-scripts. What appears now to be the case is that the discourse represen- 
tation is not just one type of semantic information (e.g. a complex hierarchical semantic net) 
but a whole structure of various d-sentences and set of d-sentences belonging to different 
levels of languages and logical types. Hence the semantic information now looks more like an 
algebraic structure than a classical semantic net. It is some of the formal structures of these 
algebraic d-sentences that we shall now explore and discuss. 
3. E-SCRIPT AND GRAMMAR 
From a formal point of view, an e-script can now be seen as a set of sentences, each of 
which in turn can be thought of as belonging to a different language (hereafter called 
transcription language or LT); i.e. all sentences of the e-script are either sentences that are 
transcriptions of the original text or sentences that are statements about the various aspects 
involved in the semantics of the f-sentences. Each t-language and its sentences can be of 
various logical status. 
But even if all each sentences can have in this “semantic space” different logical status, it is 
possible to think of them as being formed or generated from a common grammar, by which we 
mean that all languages have the same types of rules. So before discussing the possible 
rellations between the various sentences we shall briefly define this common grammar. 
Each sentence of the e-script can theoretically be thought of as a well-formed sentences of a 
categorical anguage, such as the one defined in the literature by Adjukiewiczs[lS], Bar 
Hillel [16] and mainly reused by Montague[ 171 and Cresswell[ 181. The definiton we will call 
upon here is influenced by the Montague one from Universal Grammar.t 
The language for each e-sentence is then defined as a quintuple: 
where (a) X, is the set of basic expressions for each 8, i.e. for each category. (b) The set A of 
categories can be defined recursively as the smallest set such that: 
(I) N E A (category of names). 
(2) S E A (category of sentences). 
(3) if (T and 7 are in A then (a, T) is also in A so the categories of a transcription language 
are the categories of the classical categorial anguages. The set A is the set of proper 
expressions. 
This set A can be defined in the following manner. Consider first the free monoid M 
generated by finited concatenation of members of U aedX,. The F, being n-place operations on 
the set of the members of M (i.e. the underlying set of M), let A be the smallest set such that: 
(1) UGAX~CA 
(2) if x = (x,, . . ,x,_,) and F, is an n-place operation, then F?(x) E A. The F, may (and 
sometimes must) vary from one language to another. Here are a few examples of these 
t Unioersal Grammar (1970) 
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Fob, Y) = XY 2concatenation 
F,(x, y) = x = y identity 
F?(x, y) = A xy function introduction 
F3(x) = -x negation 
F4(x, y) = x v y disjunction 
6(x, Y) = x A Y conjunction 
F6(x, y) = x + y implication 
F,(x, y) = x = y equivalence 
FAX, Y) =VXY universal quantification 
FAX, Y) = 31~ existential quantification 
F&x> Y) = !XY description 
F,,(x) = 2 meaning insertion 
F&r) = Ox necessity 
F,,(x) = TX time 
(d) and where S is a set of grammatical rules. The general form of these rules is the following: 
(F-f, (&)i<n, E) 
where F, is an n-place operation, Si is a category for each i and E is also a category. 
These rules mean that if the operation Fr is applied to a sequence of expressions (xi);<” 
each of them belong to L$ then the resulting expression belongs to the category E. In order to 
make the preceding definitions more concrete let us here give a few examples. In our T-script 
we could have the t-sentence T,: “Peter sees a man”. This English sentence can be described 
as being generated by a grammar of the preceding type, that is: GLI will contain a set of 
category assigning rules: 
RC,: SISN + man 
RC2: SINN-,sees 
RC,: N + Peter 
a set of operational rules 
OR,: (F,, W, SINN), SISN) 
OR?: (Fz, (N, SINN), SIN) 
OR,: 0% (S/N, S/SW, 9. 
These rules are formally equivalent to the following phrase structured rules: 
R,: S-, VP+ NP 
R2: VP + N + Vtrans 
R,: NP+a man 
R,: N --) Peter 
R5: Vtrans -+ sees. 
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Both set of rules will generate the following structure on the T-sentence. 
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F3(Fz(Peter, sees), man) 
N SINN SISN 
s 
Now our e-script does not contain only t-sentences, but also d-sentences representing various 
aspects of the semantic involved, such as 
d,: 3x (Peter Sees x A Man x) 
d?: (with PERCEIVE) (Peter, Man, Eyes) 
(a la Miller/Johnson-Laird [ 131). There could be many other d-sentences inspired by the various 
semantical theories. As said before, we could use the formulations of the Schank conceptual 
dependencies, the Wilks templates and primitives, the Charniak frames, the Metzing stereo- 
types and even representation of the time structures of Aqvist and Guenthner[l4], the 
performatives of Searle-Vandervecken and so forth. But the important hing is that they all 
ought to be generatable by a categorical language of the kind here defined. (For such a possibility 
see [14, 4, 20-221). 
For the purpose of illustration let us show that the preceding d-sentence could also be 
generated by a specific categorical grammar GL2. 
GL2 will contain: 
RC;: SISN + Man 
RC;: SINN + sees 
RC;: N--f Peter 
and 
OR;: 0% (SIN), S) 
OR;: (Fi, (N, SINN), S/N) 
OR;: UT, (SIN), S) 
OR;: (F:, (S, S), S) 
OR;: 0% (9, S) 
and will generate the following structure 
F;(Peter sees, man) = (F$(FA(F;(F;(Pejer sees), Fi q,a$))). 
S/ NN 
Now we can define F; such that 
FXPeter, sees, man) = F;(Fi(Peter, sees), man) = Zx(Peter Sees x A Man x). 
As can be seen from the preceding definitions and examples, it is theoretically possible to 
think of all the d-sentences of the e-script as well-formed sentences of a common grammar 
defined in the Montague fashion. And we stress that the “theoretically possible” aspect of this 
task is mainly realizable if empirically one can find a good working hypothesis for the 
syntactical and conceptual structure involved. The important hing here is to underling the 
possibility of expressing these conceptual-semantical structures in well-defined grammar and 
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not just in a conglomerate of primitives. Because these sentences will be so expressed, their 
logical status and structure will be more evident and hence permit a better understanding of the 
various relations involved. 
4. THE TRANSCRIPTIONS 
Having now defined an e-script as a complex set of t- and d-sentences all embedded in 
common grammar and constituting various different languages, is it possible to find a certain 
relational structure among them? This question is a subquestion of what the text-grammarians 
call the “coherence” problem[23] and overlaps what text-understanding systems call the 
plan, scenario and frames[24] or the mapping languages of Petofi[lO]; i.e. a discourse is not a 
simple amalgam of sentences. It presents a proper structure. Our intention here is not to 
summarize or to criticize some of the attempts made to solve this problem. We intend only to 
show how the theoretical frameworks of the transcription languages treat some aspects of this 
problem for P-sysfems for NPNL texts. What we shall specifically present here concerns some 
of the formal properties of the rules permitting a set of e-sentences to relate to each other. Let 
us consider two languages Li and L) Each language contains a set of sentences Si and Si. Each 
of which expresses a specific aspect of the e-sentence. We then can define a relation T between 
these two sets such that T is a transcription or mapping from L, into L2. This transcription will 
be in fact a function defined as the triplet such that the transcriptoin Tlz is a morphism between 
two languages L, and L2. This morphism is represented in the following commutative diagram 
Al” 
T?2 
-Azm 
where T12 is a transcription, F,2 maps the category of L, on categories of Lz and Liz maps 
n-place operations of L, on a corresponding n-place operation of LZ. These rules mean: 
(1) That a transcription between two languages preserves categorial properties, or, in other 
words, two expressions of the same category have their transcription in a same category. 
(2) That if an expression results from an operation on other expressions, the transcription of 
the first expression is the result of a corresponding operation on the transcriptions of the other 
expressions. 
Let us illustrate this transcription function on our previous example: Recall the two 
e-sentences: 
t,: Peter sees a man. 
d,: 3x(Peter sees x & man x). 
We want d, to be a transcription of t,. The transcription function on this example can be 
formally defined as: ( Tlz, Fiz, L,,) such that: 
T,,(Peter) = Peter 
T,2(sees) = sees 
T12(man) = man 
L,,(F,) = FI 
L,,(Fz) = F; 
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b#3) = 6 
F,,(N) = N 
F#/NN) = SINN 
F#/SN) = S/N 
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This function can be illustrated in the following transcription. 
T,*(Peter sees a man) = 
Tlz(F3(Peter sees)man) =
T12(F3(F2(Peter, sees))man) =
F;(F;(Peter, sees)man) =
3x(Peter sees x & man x). 
We can easily verify that this transcription is a good one and satisfies all the intended 
properties. As can be seen by this example, t, is the transcription of the logical structure of d,. 
It does not exhibit any other information possibly expressive in other d, sentences. But 
because these sentences are now defined (in a stipulative manner) as transcriptions of one into 
the other, it is possible to show their compatibility. This compatibility is always assured by the 
rule that says: the composition of a morphism is a morphism. In other words, the successive 
application of transcription functions is itself a transcription function. Hence the coherence 
problem is here translated in terms of compatible algebraic transcription. 
For instance, after having exhibited the logical structure in a d-transcript, we now could 
exhibit some of the lexical structure of certain components of this d-sentence by another 
transcription function that would produce a d3 transcript also compatible with d2 and so forth. 
Hence by means of the transcription functions we could render compatible a subset of 
sentences in the whole set of d-sentences or d-script. 
We could now summarize the theoretical postulate of our transcription framework in the 
following terms: All hypotheses for representing the semantic (and possibly the pragmatic) 
content of a f-sentence must be expressed in a categorial grammar as defined above and be 
produced by a transcription function (algorithmicly or stipulatively). This postulate is but one 
translation of the Fregean principle of compositionality. It follows then that the coherence 
relations between the discourse sentences can be expressed by syntactic relations. 
5. DEFINITIONS OF SOME INTERESTING PROBLEMS 
Having built a syntactical structure of the related d-languages we shall now analyse some 
correlative properties of this “compatible” structure. 
First, among all these languages, we shall build a tree-type structure in the following 
manner: let us consider a set of transcriptions that maps a first node L, into many. From each 
L, and down there can exist many other transcriptions that also map each L, into their 
subordinates L,,. Let us represent his tree of language in the following diagram. 
The preceding tree can be formally defined as a partially ordered set of languages where the 
ordering principle is the transcription functions between the languages. The languages in the 
tree are indexed by a sequence of ordinals where the top node is associated with the null 
sequence. The other sequence wil be recursively defined in the following manner: the top 
language is associated with the nul sequence; if L, is a language, where LY is a sequence of 
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ordinals, consider all the languages into which there exists a transcription of L,. This class can 
be well-ordered, i.e. we can give an ordinal number to each of these languages. The index of 
each of these languages will be the sequence of ordinals (Y followed by the ordinal associated 
with this language by the well-ordering relation. 
So we have a language L, that follows immediately L, if and only if there is an ordinal y 
such that: p = guy. 
This relation will be noted e and the transcription between L,, L,, 7’+. The partial 
ordering relation is obtained by taking the transitive closure of @. This new relation will be 
noted s and a tree of transcription languages will appear to be like this: 
4. ,/,‘/L‘ . . . . 
(0) iI) L . L,,: !?) 
L 
A 
L,o, I) L 
A.... 
to. 0) cn.0) L,“, I; L 
The language tree will be noted fLalnEA where A is the set of sequences of ordinals which 
serve as indexes for the tree. We define in a similar way the transcription functions tree and we 
note it [T~o,BJ~~.P)EB where B is the set of pairs of indexes ((Y, p) such that there exists a 
transcription between L, and L,. These notations erve mainly to distinguish trees from sets in 
the same way that we need to distinguish sequences from sets. 
Let us now turn to each language L, in our tree, and consider their internal deduction rules 
(i.e. for each language L,, there is a token set of sentences S,). Within this language a set of 
rules is given which allows derivation of some members of S, from others (i.e. the subset of 
proper syntactic rules of each language which permit the internal derivation of sentences from 
sentences-they are purely syntactic onsequences). A simple example would be the following. 
Consider a set of classical propositional calculus sentences. Given any set X of sentence these 
rules generate another set Y containing the formes and which can be considered as a set of 
consequences independent of any king of interpretation of the sentences. The function of these 
rules is to represent what we could call a particular deductive structure for these sentences. 
This example may seem very trivial. A less trivial example would be the addition to these of 
transformational rules, deplacement rules about quantification[25], etc. admitting, as their 
defenders do, that these rules belong to the logic of the language, i.e. their conditions of 
applicability are purely syntactic and universal. 
Let us call C,(X,) the set generated from X,, and let it be read as the set of consequences 
of X, at thelevel a. Suppose now that there is a transcription from L, into L, that is to say 
L, < L,. We now define the set of consequences of X, at the level fl as the set 
In other words, the set of consequences of X, at the level p is the set of consequences at 
the level /3 of the largest set that has the same transcription as X, in L,. 
An illustration of this would be lexical decomposition of a given type (lexical decomposition 
is certainly not a part of the logic of a language). So we suppose that we have rules of 
transcription of expressions of a language L, into another language L2 and that these 
transcription correspond to lexical decomposition. Let the two sentences S, and S2 be such that 
they are not consequence one of the other (in the first language) but that after lexical 
decomposition the first becomes a consequence of the second, i.e. 
Applying the definition we will have 
T,m.,,(W E C,U,,.,,(Sz,}, 
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But this means that S, is a consequence of SZ at the level p because we have 
and hence 
So we see that each analysis, i.e. each transcription, may enrich to set of consequences of a 
given set of sentences. 
The above formal description is an attempt o capture logical relations and ‘it shows how 
semantic inferences could be given their possible transcription as t-sentences. 
Let us now introduce the notion of consistency. This notion will be considered here in a 
relative sense, i.e. a set of sentences can be consistent at a certain level of analysis, but reveal 
itself to be inconsistent in a further analysis. 
More precisely, a set of sentences X, will be called a-consistent if for any sentence S, X, 
does not contain simultaneously this sentence and its negation. This corresponds to the classical 
notion of consistency. Now we will say that a set X, is p-consistent (for L, & J&) if T,,.,,(X,) 
is P-consistent. This last definition means that a set of sentence is consistent at any level if the 
transcription of the set of sentences at this level does not reveal a contradiction. For example, 
suppose that the language L, is a language used for lexical decomposition and that in this 
language the sentence “John killed Mary” has a transcription something like “John CAUSE 
Mary BECOME dead”. Suppose further that the syntactic rules of this language are such that 
from a sentence like “A CAUSE (B BECOME P)” we can infer by syntactic rules a sentence 
like “B IS P”. In that case, if the sentence “Mary is alive” receives as transcription the 
sentence “Mary IS NOT dead”, then the set “John killed Mary”, “Mary is alive” will be 
p-inconsistent. 
These definitions can be generalized. Let [La],,,,, be a tree of languages, and I[~~,P,]~~.PjEB 
be the corresponding tree of transcription functions. What we now want to define is not 
consistency in relation with one analysis but for the entire analysis expressed here by all the 
transcriptions of the tree. So we define the consistency of a set of sentences of the top language 
in relation with a tree of transcription functions in the following manner. If X4 is a set of 
sentences of the top language, we will say that X4 is consistent in relation with [T~,,B~j~a.P)EB if 
UaECo (X,) is &consistent. This means that a set of sentences is consistent in relation with a 
tree of transcriptions not only if none of these transcriptions leads to a contradiction, but also if 
all these transcriptions are compatible. 
The notion of consistency in relation with a tree of transcription functions permits us to 
introduce the concept of world representation. A world representation is an ordered pair 
(ir~..~~~m.~EB. X,) where X, is consistent in relation with [J&&,#B. 
A world representation will play the role of what is classically called a possible world. The 
main difference is the following: first, a world representation is always partial, i.e. an under- 
determination of what it is the case: second, a world representation is not only determinated by 
a set of sentences, but a set of sentences with their specific analysis. We could even venture to 
say that a sentence with its specific analysis is a material correspondent of what philosophers 
call propositions. 
The notion of truth in a world representation follows naturally. We will say that a sentence 
S is true for the world representation ([Tca.p,],a,B,EB, X4) if ([~~.p,]~~,.p,EB, X, U { S}) is not a 
world representation. This means that a sentence is true for a world representation if, when 
adding his negation to this world representation, we obtain a contradiction. 
We see that the notion of truth is relative to the analysis of a sentence. Furthermore, the 
definition of a world representation as a pair has consequences that two different world 
representations may have the same set of true sentences because they do not have the same 
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tree of transcription functions. Intuitively, this corresponds to the fact that we can agree on 
certain sentences, and be justified to do so, without having the same knowledge of the content 
of the sentence. An example will illustrate this point. Consider the sentence “It is raining”. A 
child, a philosophy teacher and a meteorologist may agree on the truth value of this sentence 
just by looking through the window but they certainly do not have the same analysis of the 
situation. And this does not mean that one of them has a false representation of “It is raining”. 
CONCLUSIONS 
As it may be seen by the preceding analysis, our research intention is to explore the possible 
integration of some of the concepts of formal theories of semantics into the specific problems 
of computer processing of a non pre-edited natural language text. In this report, we have 
presented some distinctions which allow us to give to each sentence of the original text and of 
the underlying discourse a formal representation and a logical status. As we have shown, each 
sentence is transcribed in an algebraic form that has its proper syntactic inferences. Each 
sentence also receives a logical status expressive of either the truth conditions of another 
sentence or a possible state of the world for a set of sentences. 
Sentences, thus have different logical types; some express intensions others extensions and, 
as such, build up a complex system. 
The character of the descriptions presented above may seem very abstract, but we believe 
that they are essential for understanding the various types of information involved in text 
processing. And in the specific paradigm in which we are working no system will have access to 
a semantic level if these distinctions are not made. 
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